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
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AN ANALYSIS OF THE DIPLOMATIC PROCESS USED TO ACHIEVE THE LIBYAN ‘NO-FLY ZONE’ UN RESOLUTION

Biographical note: Alex Carle is a New Zealander, currently living in the South of France. She has a Masters in Educational Psychology and worked with the New Zealand Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Child and Youth Services on Rehabilitation programs for High Risk Recidivist Youth Offenders. Since then she has lived and worked in numerous countries establishing child protection programs in emergency and development contexts (Haiti, Iraq, Dominican Republic, Palestine, Kenya, and Indonesia). Now she is a full time student and mother of two.

1) Introduction

The current wave of regime changes moving across the Arab world has been inspiring for onlookers, and a mine field of diplomatic negotiations for politicians. With major regime changes happening at pace, and with the speed of reporting and imagery from the various locations (themselves having an impact on the outcome) being sent to millions of viewers around the world, the current situation represents a modern example of international diplomacy, that is interesting to analyze.

Many of the trends in modern diplomacy can be seen at work in the example of the negotiation resulting in the Libyan No-Fly Zone. As Barston (2006, 5) states, 'Diplomacies new style involves "democratic" conception of international relations requiring public explanation and open diplomacy, despite its growing complexity.'

Adam Watson describes modern diplomacy as having a 'wide range of ministries involved in diplomacy; the corresponding decline in the influence of the foreign minister; the increase in the direct involvement in the heads of government...; and the growth in importance of the news media.' (Barston, 2006, 5).

In the following report, a number of key concepts will be defined, followed by a general time line of the main events leading up to the final vote on the 'no-fly zone', or Resolution 1973. The report will then focus on analyzing the process with regards to the style of diplomacy used to achieve this result.

Much more could be discussed on this subject, such as how and why individual countries and institutions changed their positions and the diplomatic strategies involved in achieving this. It would also be interesting to look at the historical changes within international diplomacy and discuss how similar events unfolded in the past, with vastly different ramifications. However, due to space and time

limitations, the paper will focus on examples of modern diplomatic tools used to achieve the No-fly Zone vote.

2) Definitions

a) *Diplomacy*

As Barston points out ‘Diplomacy is concerned with the management of relations between states and between states and other actors,’ (2006, 1) and that one of the developments distinguishing modern diplomacy is the blurring of the lines between diplomatic activity and violence (2006, 1). This blurring is very apparent in the recent events unfolding in Libya as the vote involves violence being used in an effort to ‘save’ civilian lives. Barston also writes about the burden of multilateral diplomacy but in the Libyan context we see very clearly the power of its use.

b) *United Nations Charter*

The Charter of the United Nations is the founding treaty for the United Nations. It was signed in 1945 and is ratified by all members of the United Nations which currently stands at 192 nations and includes Libya, Tunisia and Yemen.

Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter sets out the United Nations Security Councils power to maintain peace. It states that the Council can ‘determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression’ and to ‘restore international peace and security.’ (1945, Article 39). This includes the establishment of peacekeeping operations, the establishment of international sanctions and the authorization of military action.

There are 15 members of the Security Council, of which China, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States and France have permanent status and the right to

veto any decision. The ten elected, non-permanent members who represent their geographical region¹, and who do not have a veto are currently: Lebanon, South Africa, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Columbia, Portugal, Nigeria, Gabon, Germany, India and Brazil.

c) Resolution 1973

A new Resolution was adopted on 17th of March 2011 on the situation in Libya, and was called Resolution 1973 (2011). See Appendix A for the full resolution. In summary, it states that member states will ‘take all necessary measures’ to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack.’ Resolution 1973 followed on the heels of Resolution 1970 (2011) which called for an asset freeze, an arms embargo, and an immediate cease fire and travel restrictions on Libyan leaders.

d) League of Arab States

The League of Arab States is a regional organization of Arab States with 22 members and four observers. Yemen and Tunisia are members of the Arab League. Libya was suspended on the 22nd of February 2011 from the League due to Colonel Gadhafi’s speech, where he refuses to step down as leader of Libya. The League of Arab Nations voted to install a No-Fly Zone over Libya and some countries are in the coalition to enforce it.

e) African Union

The African Union consists of 53 African States of whom Libya is one. The Union has taken a comparatively mild stance on the Libyan situation. They have

¹ The geographical regions are: Africa (3), Asia (2), Latin America and the Caribbean (2), Western European and others (2), Eastern European (1). One of these members must be an Arab country.

asked for a cease fire, for humanitarian convoys to be allowed to access civilians, and they sent representatives to try to negotiate a peaceful outcome to the situation. Many African Leaders disagreed with the No-Fly Zone idea, but the African Union did not have a unanimous position on the issue.

3) Time Line

a) Public Protest

19 December 2010, in Tunisia, 13 January 2011 in Algeria, and 17 January 2011 in Egypt, three different young men set themselves alight in protest at rising food and oil prices and harsh regimes (Blight and Pulman, 2011). Violent mass protests erupted across the Arab world.

b) Presidents Fall

- 16 January 2011 the Tunisian president resigns following mass protests (Blight and Pulman, 2011).
- 11 February 2011 the Egyptian President stands down.

c) Libya

Following days of uprisings, on the 21 February 2011, two Libyan pilots flee to Malta, starting a landslide of officials fleeing Libya (Blight and Pulman, 2011,).

22 February, General Gadhafi makes the first of a number of televised addresses to the nation calling on loyalists to take to the streets (Blight and Pulman, 2011). He calls the protesters cockroaches and rats that do not deserve to live. These were comments chillingly similar to those in Rwanda in 1995. He refuses to step down as president resulting in Libya's suspension from the League of Arab States.

25 February, The Human Rights Council establishes the Resolution 1970 where it commits to; dispatch an independent international inquiry into the situation in Libya (Secretary General's Special Envoy), refers Libya to the International Criminal Court, implements an arms embargo, a travel ban, and an asset freeze on Libya, and finally demands an immediate ceasefire.

2 March, Libya is banned from the Human Rights Council

11 March, the French President calls for targeted airstrikes on Libya.

12 March, the Arab League votes on supporting a No-fly Zone. It was opposed only by Syria.

12 March, the African Union dispatches representatives to travel to Libya to find a solution to stop the violence peacefully.

18 March, Resolution 1973 is voted in by 10 votes in favor, 0 against and 5 abstentions (Brazil, China, Germany, India and Russia).

19 March, Western air and missiles strike Libya.

June 2011, fighting continues. European countries question the ongoing fighting in Libya, The African Union and the Arab League no longer supports the military interventions in Libya.

4) Analysis of the No-Fly Zone

a) History

Resolution 1973 is the product of a concept adopted by the United Nations in 2005. This is called the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and is the principal that 'when a sovereign state fails to prevent atrocities, foreign governments may intervene

to stop them.² This principal is being constantly refined (and debated), following lessons learned from history: Bosnia, Rwanda, Cambodia, Kosovo, Iraq and finally Darfur. ‘Human Rights advocates say it saves lives and skeptics see it as too easily misused to be useful.’ (The Economist, 2011, 65). The use of the Responsibility to Protect for Libya will undoubtedly affect the manner in which the UN Security Council reacts the next time the principal is adopted. In my opinion, the fact that the principal was relatively quickly instituted, in this instance, is in no small part due to the last major time the principal was not adequately used, and the world watched on as the Darfur massacre ensued. In Chapter Three Berridge mentions how the circumstances of recent history plays a role in current diplomacy.

b) Diplomatic Structure

The diplomatic process was, in this instance, within a very structured, legal multilateral and high profile context. The United Nations Security Council is an International Organization with a permanent secretariat housed in a permanent headquarters and is virtually a continuous session (Berridge, 2002, 151). This permanent status of the multilateral conference has significant advantages, including an accumulation of specialized knowledge, and the ability to constantly survey a situation (Berridge, 2002, 152). The fact that the power structure is ‘frozen’ in place in the Security Council³ (Berridge, 2002, 153) was less of an issue in this specific example, as unprecedentedly both Russia and China did not use their veto powers. The hard work in the pre-negotiation stage, of gathering global accordance on the

² http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_1964

³ Not reflecting the current power balances in the world today

issue, prior to the vote, paid off when the League of Arab States and the African Union issued their support for the idea in principal.

c) Use of Momentum, Language and the Media

Berridge sets out an entire chapter on Momentum (Diplomatic Momentum, 2002, Chapter 4). In this instance, the continual pressure of more civilian casualties passing with every hour was used frequently, to keep the momentum going, and it worked. The Security Council did not wait for the Secretary General's special envoy to Libya to send its report prior to voting, and attacks took place within 24 hours of the vote.

Kiesling (2006, 156) discusses the evolution of the use of the media in modern diplomacy. In this instance, the media was a key player in maintaining momentum by issuing reports on the situation on the ground (e.g.: one million civilians in Benghazi, protesters cry for help) and making numerous references to the Rwandan and Somalian genocides. Key politicians were using the media on a daily basis either to their own constituencies or to other leaders. Leguey-Feilleux mentions how states are becoming increasingly aware of the public's opinion in foreign relations and how 'diplomats are enlisted in the effort to sway the public.' (224). This is in contrast to diplomacy usually being a 'quiet interaction away from the lime light and mass media' (Leguey-Feilleux, 2009, 224) and historically involving only the elite.

Ross (2007, 206) interestingly discusses how the feedback system of democracy does not exist in international politics⁴, to which we are all involved and hence the importance of their citizens opinions on the issue at hand. This is especially crucial in an election year or in an economic crisis where money is believed to be taken from

⁴ Politicians are not elected from civilians of other countries to whom their policies and decisions effect.

local services to fund global responses. Opinions or possible actions are often leaked to the press purposefully to ascertain the public's response prior to taking decisions.

The use of the media to quickly pass key messages was also a technique used by all parties including Colonel Gadhafi himself, who appeared on Libyan Television numerous times responding to previous emissions from other leaders. The Libyan Foreign Minister responded live on television to the No-fly Zone vote stating that there will be an immediate ceasefire (which there was not).

Strikingly the 'No-fly Zone' term gives the impression to the public of a peaceful, non-active response – one presumes that no one is allowed to fly in the Libyan air space. Would the same public support have been aroused if the vote was called War on Gaddafi or Fighting the Libyan Forces for example? This is an example of how diplomatic language and terminology can be very persuasive in the two minute sound bite context of the current media on complex issues.

5) Conclusion

The multilateral negotiations terminating in the unanimous vote for the No-fly Zone in Libya was a display of modern diplomacy in action. Numerous global institutions and structures were used, for example; the United Nations, NATO, African Union, Arab League of Nations, Human Rights Council, International Criminal Court. High level politicians, presidents and prime ministers issued statements and tried to rally support for their cause both nationally and with other leaders of countries and institutions. Live media was used as a tool of communication to pass messages quickly, to test public opinion and to rally support for the various sides of the debate. Momentum was maintained by; using key figures; filling the media with the news, pictures and stories about fear, refugees and war; news of

similar Arab nation uprisings; and the constant threat of the number of civilian casualties that could have been avoided. This all lead to a lot of pressure to take action against a dictator who had been supported up until recently by many developed nations governments.

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7) Appendix A: Security Council SC/10200

Resolution

The full text of resolution 1973 (2011) reads as follows:

“The Security Council,

“Recalling its resolution 1970 (2011) of 26 February 2011,

“Deploing the failure of the Libyan authorities to comply with resolution 1970 (2011),

“Expressing grave concern at the deteriorating situation, the escalation of violence, and the heavy civilian casualties,

“Reiterating the responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population and reaffirming that parties to armed conflicts bear the primary responsibility to take all feasible steps to ensure the protection of civilians,

“Condemning the gross and systematic violation of human rights, including arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, torture and summary executions,

“Further condemning acts of violence and intimidation committed by the Libyan authorities against journalists, media professionals and associated personnel and urging these authorities to comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law as outlined in resolution 1738 (2006),

“Considering that the widespread and systematic attacks currently taking place in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya against the civilian population may amount to crimes against humanity,

“Recalling paragraph 26 of resolution 1970 (2011) in which the Council expressed its readiness to consider taking additional appropriate measures, as necessary, to facilitate and support the return of humanitarian agencies and make available humanitarian and related assistance in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

“Expressing its determination to ensure the protection of civilians and civilian populated areas and the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance and the safety of humanitarian personnel,

“Recalling the condemnation by the League of Arab States, the African Union and the Secretary-General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference of the serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law that have been and are being committed in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

“Taking note of the final communiqué of the Organization of the Islamic Conference of 8 March 2011, and the communiqué of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union of 10 March 2011 which established an ad hoc High-Level Committee on Libya,

“Taking note also of the decision of the Council of the League of Arab States of 12 March 2011 to call for the imposition of a no-fly zone on Libyan military aviation, and to establish safe areas in places exposed to shelling as a precautionary measure that allows the protection of the Libyan people and foreign nationals residing in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

“Taking note further of the Secretary-General’s call on 16 March 2011 for an immediate ceasefire,

“*Recalling* its decision to refer the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya since 15 February 2011 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, and *stressing* that those responsible for or complicit in attacks targeting the civilian population, including aerial and naval attacks, must be held to account,

“*Reiterating its concern* at the plight of refugees and foreign workers forced to flee the violence in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, *welcoming* the response of neighbouring States, in particular Tunisia and Egypt, to address the needs of those refugees and foreign workers, and *calling on* the international community to support those efforts,

“*Deploring* the continuing use of mercenaries by the Libyan authorities,

“*Considering* that the establishment of a ban on all flights in the airspace of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya constitutes an important element for the protection of civilians as well as the safety of the delivery of humanitarian assistance and a decisive step for the cessation of hostilities in Libya,

“*Expressing concern* also for the safety of foreign nationals and their rights in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

“*Welcoming* the appointment by the Secretary General of his Special Envoy to Libya, Mr. Abdul Ilah Mohamed Al-Khatib and supporting his efforts to find a sustainable and peaceful solution to the crisis in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

“*Reaffirming* its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

“*Determining* that the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

“*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

“1. *Demands* the immediate establishment of a ceasefire and a complete end to violence and all attacks against, and abuses of, civilians;

“2. *Stresses* the need to intensify efforts to find a solution to the crisis which responds to the legitimate demands of the Libyan people and *notes* the decisions of the Secretary-General to send his Special Envoy to Libya and of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union to send its ad hoc High-Level Committee to Libya with the aim of facilitating dialogue to lead to the political reforms necessary to find a peaceful and sustainable solution;

“3. *Demands* that the Libyan authorities comply with their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law, human rights and refugee law and take all measures to protect civilians and meet their basic needs, and to ensure the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance;

“Protection of civilians

“4. *Authorizes* Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory, and *requests* the Member States concerned to inform the Secretary-General immediately of the measures they take pursuant to the authorization conferred by this paragraph which shall be immediately reported to the Security Council;

“5. *Recognizes* the important role of the League of Arab States in matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security in the region, and bearing in mind Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, requests the Member States of the League of Arab States to cooperate with other Member States in the implementation of paragraph 4;

“No-fly zone

“6. *Decides* to establish a ban on all flights in the airspace of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in order to help protect civilians;

“7. *Decides further* that the ban imposed by paragraph 6 shall not apply to flights whose sole purpose is humanitarian, such as delivering or facilitating the delivery of assistance, including medical supplies, food, humanitarian workers and related assistance, or evacuating foreign nationals from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, nor shall it apply to flights authorised by paragraphs 4 or 8, nor other flights which are deemed necessary by States acting under the authorization conferred in paragraph 8 to be for the benefit of the Libyan people, and that these flights shall be coordinated with any mechanism established under paragraph 8;

“8. *Authorizes* Member States that have notified the Secretary-General and the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to take all necessary measures to enforce compliance with the ban on flights imposed by paragraph 6 above, as necessary, and *requests* the States concerned in cooperation with the League of Arab States to coordinate closely with the Secretary General on the measures they are taking to implement this ban, including by establishing an appropriate mechanism for implementing the provisions of paragraphs 6 and 7 above,

“9. *Calls upon* all Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to provide assistance, including any necessary overflight approvals, for the purposes of implementing paragraphs 4, 6, 7 and 8 above;

“10. *Requests* the Member States concerned to coordinate closely with each other and the Secretary-General on the measures they are taking to implement paragraphs 4, 6, 7 and 8 above, including practical measures for the monitoring and approval of authorised humanitarian or evacuation flights;

“11. *Decides* that the Member States concerned shall inform the Secretary-General and the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States immediately of measures taken in exercise of the authority conferred by paragraph 8 above, including to supply a concept of operations;

“12. *Requests* the Secretary-General to inform the Council immediately of any actions taken by the Member States concerned in exercise of the authority conferred by paragraph 8 above and to report to the Council within 7 days and every month thereafter on the implementation of this resolution, including information on any violations of the flight ban imposed by paragraph 6 above;

“Enforcement of the arms embargo

“13. *Decides that* paragraph 11 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall be replaced by the following paragraph : “Calls upon all Member States, in particular States of the region, acting nationally or through regional organisations or arrangements, in order to ensure strict implementation of the arms embargo established by paragraphs 9 and 10 of resolution 1970 (2011), to inspect in their territory, including seaports and airports, and on the high seas, vessels and aircraft bound to or from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, if the State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 9 or 10 of resolution 1970 (2011) as modified by this resolution, including the provision of armed mercenary personnel, *calls upon* all flag States of such vessels and aircraft to cooperate with such inspections and authorises Member States to use all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances to carry out such inspections”;

“14. *Requests* Member States which are taking action under paragraph 13 above on the high seas to coordinate closely with each other and the Secretary-General and *further requests* the States concerned to inform the Secretary-General and the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 24 of resolution 1970 (2011) (“the Committee”) immediately of measures taken in the exercise of the authority conferred by paragraph 13 above;

“15. *Requires* any Member State whether acting nationally or through regional organisations or arrangements, when it undertakes an inspection pursuant to paragraph 13 above, to submit promptly an initial written report to the Committee containing, in particular, explanation of the grounds for the inspection, the results of such inspection, and whether or not cooperation was provided, and, if prohibited items for transfer are found, further requires such Member States to submit to the Committee, at a later stage, a subsequent written report containing relevant details on the inspection, seizure, and disposal, and relevant details of the transfer, including a description of the items, their origin and intended destination, if this information is not in the initial report;

“16. *Deplores* the continuing flows of mercenaries into the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and *calls upon* all Member States to comply strictly with their obligations under paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) to prevent the provision of armed mercenary personnel to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya;

“Ban on flights

“17. *Decides* that all States shall deny permission to any aircraft registered in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya or owned or operated by Libyan nationals or companies to take off from, land in or overfly their territory unless the particular flight has been approved in advance by the Committee, or in the case of an emergency landing;

“18. *Decides that* all States shall deny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly their territory, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the aircraft contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 9 and 10 of resolution 1970 (2011) as modified by this resolution, including the provision of armed mercenary personnel, except in the case of an emergency landing;

“Asset freeze

“19. *Decides* that the asset freeze imposed by paragraph 17, 19, 20 and 21 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall apply to all funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories, which are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the Libyan authorities, as designated by the Committee, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, as designated by the Committee, and *decides further* that all States shall ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any individuals or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of the Libyan authorities, as designated by the Committee, or individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them, as designated by the Committee, and directs the Committee to designate such Libyan authorities, individuals or entities within 30 days of the date of the adoption of this resolution and as appropriate thereafter;

“20. *Affirms* its determination to ensure that assets frozen pursuant to paragraph 17 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall, at a later stage, as soon as possible be made available to and for the benefit of the people of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya;

“21. *Decides* that all States shall require their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and firms incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction to exercise vigilance when doing business with entities incorporated in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya or subject to its jurisdiction, and any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and entities owned or controlled by them, if the States have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such business could contribute to violence and use of force against civilians;

“Designations

“22. *Decides* that the individuals listed in Annex I shall be subject to the travel restrictions imposed in paragraphs 15 and 16 of resolution 1970 (2011), and *decides* further that the individuals and entities listed in Annex II shall be subject to the asset freeze imposed in paragraphs 17, 19, 20 and 21 of resolution 1970 (2011);

“23. *Decides* that the measures specified in paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 19, 20 and 21 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall apply also to individuals and entities determined by the Council or the Committee to have violated the provisions of resolution 1970 (2011), particularly paragraphs 9 and 10 thereof, or to have assisted others in doing so;

“Panel of Experts

“24. *Requests* the Secretary-General to create for an initial period of one year, in consultation with the Committee, a group of up to eight experts (“Panel of Experts”), under the direction of the Committee to carry out the following tasks:

(a) Assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate as specified in paragraph 24 of resolution 1970 (2011) and this resolution;

(b) Gather, examine and analyse information from States, relevant United Nations bodies, regional organisations and other interested parties regarding the implementation of the measures decided in resolution 1970 (2011) and this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance;

(c) Make recommendations on actions the Council, or the Committee or State, may consider to improve implementation of the relevant measures;

(d) Provide to the Council an interim report on its work no later than 90 days after the Panel’s appointment, and a final report to the Council no later than 30 days prior to the termination of its mandate with its findings and recommendations;

“25. *Urges* all States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties, to cooperate fully with the Committee and the Panel of Experts, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal on the implementation of the measures decided in resolution 1970 (2011) and this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance;

“26. *Decides* that the mandate of the Committee as set out in paragraph 24 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall also apply to the measures decided in this resolution;

“27. *Decides* that all States, including the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, shall take the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the Libyan authorities, or of any person or body in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, or of any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or body, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was affected by reason of the measures taken by the Security Council in resolution 1970 (2011), this resolution and related resolutions;

“28. *Reaffirms* its intention to keep the actions of the Libyan authorities under continuous review and underlines its readiness to review at any time the measures imposed by this resolution and resolution 1970 (2011), including by strengthening, suspending or lifting those measures, as appropriate, based on compliance by the Libyan authorities with this resolution and resolution 1970 (2011);

“29. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.”

Libya: United Nations Security Council proposed designations

<i>Number Name</i>	<i>Justification</i>	<i>Identifiers</i>
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<i>Number</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Justification</i>	<i>Identifiers</i>
Annex I: Travel Ban			
1	QUREN SALIH QUREN AL QADHAFI	Libyan Ambassador to Chad. Has left Chad for Sabha. Involved directly in recruiting and coordinating mercenaries for the regime.	
2	Colonel AMID HUSAIN AL KUNI	Governor of Ghat (South Libya). Directly involved in recruiting mercenaries.	
Annex II: Asset Freeze			
1	Dorda, Abu Zayd Umar	Position: Director, External Security Organisation	
2	Jabir, Major General Abu Bakr Yunis	Position: Defence Minister	Title: Major General DOB: --/-- /1952. POB: Jalo, Libya
3	Matuq, Matuq Mohammed	Position: Secretary for Utilities	DOB: --/--/1956. POB: Khoms
4	Qadhafi, Mohammed Muammar	Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime	DOB: --/--/1970. POB: Tripoli, Libya
5	Qadhafi, Saadi	Commander Special Forces. Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime. Command of military units involved in repression of demonstrations	DOB: 25/05/1973. POB: Tripoli, Libya
6	Qadhafi, Saif al-Arab	Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime	DOB: --/--/1982. POB: Tripoli, Libya
7	Al-Senussi, Colonel Abdullah	Position: Director Military Intelligence	Title: Colonel DOB: --/--/1949. POB: Sudan
Entities			
1	Central Bank of Libya	Under control of Muammar Qadhafi and his family, and potential source of funding for his regime.	
2	Libyan Investment Authority	Under control of Muammar Qadhafi and his family, and potential source of funding for his regime.	a.k.a: Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company (LAFICO) Address: 1 Fateh Tower Office, No 99 22nd Floor, Borgaida Street, Tripoli, Libya, 1103
3	Libyan Foreign Bank	Under control of Muammar Qadhafi and his family and a potential source of funding for his regime.	
4	Libyan Africa Investment Portfolio	Under control of Muammar Qadhafi and his family, and potential source of funding for his regime.	Address: Jamahiriya Street, LAP Building, PO Box 91330, Tripoli, Libya
5	Libyan National Oil Corporation	Under control of Muammar Qadhafi and his family, and potential source of funding for his regime.	Address: Bashir Saadwi Street, Tripoli, Tarabulus, Libya